Easy to Attack: Why Tiny Building Automation Markets Increase Cyber Risk

The Problem with Tiny Markets

In large software ecosystems, widespread deployment increases the chance that bugs and vulnerabilities are discovered, reproduced, and reported. In contrast, building automation markets are relatively small and highly diverse—many manufacturers, many product variants, and comparatively fewer installations per product line. With fewer deployments, there are fewer opportunities for issues to surface through real-world usage, and fewer customers with the scale (or incentives) to perform deep security testing and responsible disclosure.

Another factor is economics. When products are sold in lower volume, manufacturers may have less budget to fund extensive test/validation programs, long-term penetration testing, or broad third-party security reviews across many firmware versions and configurations. The outcome is not that vendors “do not care,” but that security maturity can lag behind mainstream IT where testing infrastructure and scrutiny are routinely larger.

Physical Access Makes Attacks Easier

Cybersecurity for building automation is not only about protocols and encryption—it is also about who can touch the system. If unauthorized or untracked access to panels, network closets, or commissioning activities is possible, then an attacker may not need sophisticated zero-day exploits. In many facilities, contractors and integrators can make changes (firmware updates, configuration edits, device additions) with minimal oversight, and those changes may not be formally verified afterward.

Example Scenario: Why Oversight Matters

The following example is intended to illustrate a common risk pattern: during construction or maintenance, it may be possible for someone to gain access to building automation areas without strong credential checks, install or replace devices, update firmware, capture network traffic, or introduce unauthorized network equipment. If such actions are not monitored and audited, an attacker could potentially create persistent access, disrupt operations, or manipulate control logic—especially if the site relies on legacy protocols and permissive network design.

Practical Takeaways for Owners and Integrators

• Design for auditability: log configuration changes, firmware updates, and device additions.
• Segment networks: isolate BAS/OT networks from IT and from guest/contractor access paths.
• Control physical access: treat BAS panels and network closets as sensitive infrastructure.
• Reduce “quiet failures”: monitor for new MAC addresses, rogue DHCP, and unexpected traffic.
• Assume heterogeneity: plan security controls that work even when vendors differ widely.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)

Why do “tiny markets” matter in cybersecurity?

Fewer deployments usually means fewer independent testers, fewer reported vulnerabilities, and fewer chances to observe edge cases in the field. This can slow down the rate at which security issues are identified and fixed.

Is this mainly a protocol problem (BACnet, Modbus, etc.)?

Protocols matter, but many real incidents combine multiple factors: legacy protocol limitations, flat networks, weak logging, and insufficient physical or operational controls around who can make changes.

What is the quickest improvement most sites can make?

Start with network segmentation and change auditing. If you can restrict access paths and reliably detect unauthorized changes, you reduce both likelihood and impact of many attacks.